The final agreement stipulated that ”the provisional government currently working in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis, including Polish and Polish democratic leaders abroad.”  Yalta`s language recognized the supremacy of the pro-Soviet Lublin government in a provisional government, albeit a reorganized one.  24 Before the start of the war, Stalin had to obtain the approval of Chiang Kai-shek on the provisions of Yalta. The provisions of the Yalta secret agreement grossly violated the sovereign rights of the Chinese government. Although Chiang Kai-shek was informed of Yalta`s secret agreement a few weeks after the conference, he was not officially informed of its specific provisions concerning The Chinese territory until 15 June. Stalin and Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong began negotiations on 2 July. Soong stressed China`s rights to Outer Mongolia, the railways and ports of Manchuria. While China insisted that it could not make concessions on these issues of sovereignty, these were the indispensable acquisitions on which future Soviet security would depend. The unsuccessful negotiations were interrupted when Stalin and Molotov left Moscow for Potsdam and Soong returned to Chongqing for further instructions.30 Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalin said that ”for the Soviet government, the question of Poland is a matter of honor” and security because Poland has served as a historic corridor for forces trying to invade Russia.
 In addition, Stalin told history: ”Because the Russians had sinned strongly against Poland,” ”the Soviet government tried to atone for these sins.”  Stalin concluded that ”Poland must be strong” and that ”the Soviet Union is interested in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland.” As a result, Stalin stated that the demands of the Polish government in exile are not negotiable: the Soviet Union would retain the territory of eastern Poland, which it had already annexed in 1939, and Poland should be compensated by the expansion of its western borders at the expense of Germany. Contrary to his previously proclaimed position, Stalin promised free elections in Poland, although he recently had one of its members in the Soviet provisional government occupied by the Red Army. 39 According to Gromyko, when Stalin returned to his villa, he commented that the United States, through the nuclear monopoly, would force the Soviet Union to accept its plans for Europe. ”Well, that won`t happen,” he says, and cursed ”in the mature language,” Stalin then pledged to speed up Soviet production of the bomb. Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 110. The fact that Stalin immediately understood that Truman was talking about the atomic bomb is also confirmed by Ischukov and Molotov. G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmyhshleniia, Vol.
3 (M. Novosti, 1992), 336; F. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Mr. Terra-Terra, 1991), 81. You will find the Soviet Secret Service report on the Manhattan project under Holloway, ”Jockeying for Position in the Postwar World,” 167. An important question to consider further is the extent to which the American atomic bomb entered Stalin`s strategy for the war against Japan. When did Stalin think the Americans would use the atomic bomb against Japan? Considering that the Soviet secret services misjudged the timing of the Alamogordo test, it is more likely that Stalin did not have the information that the Americans were so close to the use of the atomic bomb.